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comparison to the 45% combined efficiency of traditional centralized boiler steam and power plant electricity systems. 3 In the presence of multiple market failures, addressing only one of the failures does not necessarily lead to a Pareto improvement (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956 ). Bennear and Stavins (2007) further clarify the problem as it is relevant for pollution and energy efficiency investment failures by noting that "market failures can be jointly ameliorating (correction of one market failure ameliorates welfare losses from the other), jointly reinforcing (correction of one market failure exacerbates welfare losses from the other), or neutral (correction of one market failure does not affect the welfare losses from the other)."
In this light cap-and-trade instruments may be ameliorating to the energy efficiency gap if the gains from plants' investments in energy efficiency are greater than the losses associated with reduced distributed generation. Both policies are reinforcing to the market failures associated with other air pollutants, however, if coal generation from traditional power plants is replacing natural gas generation in manufacturing. A common finding in the second best literature studying multiple market failures is that more policy instruments capable of addressing different failures are often preferable to less (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012 , Bennear and Stavins, 2007 , Fischer and Newell, 2008 , Goulder and Parry, 2008 . Subsidies and informational provision for energy efficient R&D are likely to be jointly ameliorating with the problem of pollution externalities and move us closer to a first best outcome. This paper is related to the empirical literature studying the impact of the US EPA's National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) on manufacturing activities. Such manufacturing studies typically use confidential US Census of Manufactures (CMF) data to study the impact of NAAQS on topics such as 3 Data on the share of combined heat and power in manufacturing is available from the 1998 MECS. 5 employment, sales, productivity, and compliance costs (e.g. Becker, 2005 , Gray and Shadbegian, 1998 , Greenstone, 2002 , Greenstone et al., 2012 , Levinson, 1996 , Shadbegian and Gray, 2005 , 2003 . NOx RACT and RECLAIM are policies aimed at NAAQS nonattainment counties for ozone and nitrogen dioxide, but my study is different from previous studies using NAAQS and CMF data in a few key areas. First, the previous studies of NAAQS using CMF data generally focus on the early periods of the US Clean Air Act when NAAQS were first implemented in the 1970's. The NOx RACT and RECLAIM policies were ushered in with the 1990 amendments of the Clean Air Act, so the timeframe analyzed herein is much more recent. Second, this study identifies the actual manufacturing plants that are subject to NOx RACT and RECLAIM policies. This identification feature was not possible during the early NAAQS period because the EPA did not start a national emissions inventory for stationary point sources of criteria pollutants until 1990. Finally, this is the first study to examine the impact of NAAQS related policies on the make or buy decision for electricity.
Some recent studies have compared the heterogeneous impacts of NOx RACT and RECLAIM, but they do not use CMF data, and as a result the analyzed effects have generally been limited to analysis of emissions or industries other than manufacturing (e.g., Ferris et al., 2014 , Fowlie et al., 2012 .
By analyzing the make or buy decision within manufacturing plants, the paper is also related to a large industrial organization literature regarding the determinants of vertical integration in firms. Studies of vertical integration can generally be classified as inter-firm studies or intra-firm studies. Inter-firm studies look at the make or buy decision across firms and typically measure the overall degree of vertical integration of production processes within a firm. As such, these inter-firm studies typically measure vertical integration with comprehensive measures such as the value added to sales ratio (see, for example, Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986 , Levy, 1985 , Tucker and Wilder, 1977 . More 6 recent empirical studies use an improved measure of vertical integration based on industry level input-output (IO) matrices and whether or not a firm owns establishments in downstream industries producing intermediate inputs (Acemoglu et al., 2010 , Acemoglu et al., 2009 , Aghion et al., 2006 . Unlike value added measures, the improved IO based vertical integration measures do not conflate characteristics of profitability and horizontal integration with vertical integration. However, they also do not provide precise measures of the degree of vertical integration along an intensive margin.
Intra-firm studies of vertical integration typically consider the make or buy decision for a range of production processes within a given firm (Masten et al., 1989 , Monteverde and Teece, 1982 , Walker and Weber, 1984 . These studies have an advantage in that they can precisely measure vertical integration of specific production processes, but they are often limited to analyzing the impacts of engineer's estimates of asset specificity on the likelihood of vertical integration. This paper is similar to both intra-firm and inter-firm studies because the unit of observation is individual facilities as opposed to production processes (as in inter-firm studies), and the degree of vertical integration of the specific electricity production process within a plant is precisely measured (as in intrafirm studies).
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of the RECLAIM and NOx RACT regulatory policies relevant for manufacturing, and section 2 presents a theoretical model examining the heterogeneous impacts of cap-and-trade and command-and-control policies on vertical integration of polluting processes. Section 3 presents an overview of the CMF and NOx regulation data available for analysis, and section 4 provides estimates of the impact of NOx regulation on vertical integration decisions regarding electricity. Finally section 5 offers concluding comments.
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I. An Overview of NOx Policies
The backbone of Title I of the US Clean Air Act (CAA) regulating industrial stationary source emissions is the establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria pollutants (NO 2 , SO 2 , Pb, CO, O 3 , and PM). US counties that fail to comply with NAAQS are designated as "nonattainment" and states must submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for plant-specific abatement at major sources of criteria pollutants in order to bring nonattainment counties into compliance with NAAQS (Greenstone, 2002 
II. Theory
The profit function for a manufacturing firm currently producing their own electricity is given by the following:
where p is the price charged by firm i and ) ( i f is the firm's production function that depends on labor, L i , capital, K i , and energy inputs, E i . The marginal cost of labor, capital, and energy are given by w, r, and c, respectively. Finally, the production function is assumed to be concave satisfying the following curvature and monotonicity conditions:
Electricity generating manufacturing firms may choose to comply with NOx RACT emission standards and technology mandates by installing technology (e.g. low NOx burners and selective catalytic reduction) to reduce emissions or purchasing energy from the market at a price e that is assumed to be strictly greater than c when energy use is greater than zero. The profit for firm i procuring energy from the market is given by:
Because emission standards are process-specific (i.e. boiler standards defined on an emission per heat-input basis), investments in energy efficiency that improve output per unit of energy are not going to be rewarded as an emission reducing activity. For simplicity in the analysis that follows it is assumed that installing the 
where r is the rate of return on capital and N is the expected life of the abatement technology. Stated alternatively, if the difference in discounted profits between self-generation and market procurement is less than the fixed cost of NOx abatement technology the firm should vertically disintegrate the electricity 12 generation process. The curvature and monotonicity conditions in equations (2) and (3) The profit maximization decision for an identical vertically integrated plant operating under California's RECLAIM cap-and-trade program for NOx emissions is given by the following:
where all variables are defined as in equation (1) and the last term in equation (6) represents an additional cost per unit of emissions. As such, m is the per-unit emission price and X i is an emission factor for firm i expressing units of NOx emissions per unit of energy input. Finally, NOx emission allowances are grandfathered under RECLAIM based on historic emission levels, and A 0 is the firm's initial allocation of emission permits. It is worth noting that if actual emissions are less than the initial permit allocation (i.e.
) the firm will be a net seller of permits, and if actual emissions are greater than the initial permit allocation the firm will be a net buyer of tradable permits.
The marginal cost of energy in equation (6) is larger than the marginal cost in equation (1) by the amount mX i . This feature of the cost structure makes it seem less likely that a firm will remain vertically integrated under a cap-and-trade 13 regime in comparison to the likelihood of vertical integration under a commandand-control regime if the increased marginal cost is higher than market procurement energy prices. However, emission permits are allocated based on historic emissions, and if plants can reduce X i sufficiently to become a net seller of permits through technological pollution abatement investments the firm may be more likely to remain vertically integrated under the RECLAIM program. As an extreme example, suppose the available abatement technology can reduce the emission factor X i to 0. As before, the firm operating under technology mandates installs the technology and remains vertically integrated as long as equation (5) is satisfied. Assuming electric utilities install the technology regardless of regulatory structure and energy prices, e, are the same in the technology mandate and cap-and-trade markets implies that a plant operating under cap-and-trade will install the abatement technology if the following is satisfied: In sum, manufacturing plants operating under cap-and-trade as opposed to technology mandates appear more likely to invest in energy efficiency. The heterogeneous policy impacts on distributed generation are less certain, and depend on the relationship between the marginal cost of energy, electricity prices, and the efficiency of available emissions removal technology. In practice, testing these assumptions empirically assumes that technology mandates are actively enforced, penalties for non-compliance are sufficiently high, and the cap on pollution emissions is binding. The following section presents an overview of the data available to test these theoretical predictions, and section 4 presents formal empirical tests.
III. Data
This paper merges environmental policy data from the US EPA and California's SCAQMD to confidential plant-level manufacturing data from the 
A. Census of Manufactures
The CMF is a census of all US manufacturing plants, and the confidential data is available to researchers with special sworn status at Census Research shipments are surveyed with certainty, and smaller establishments are surveyed using probability weighting that adjusts for the establishment's contribution to industry output totals.
12
The analysis conducted herein focuses on NOx regulations of the early 1990s and uses CMF data from 1992 and 1997 supplemented with ASM data from 1993 to 1996. The 1992 to 1997 period was chosen to avoid overlap with changing NAAQS standards and electricity deregulation in California.
Specifically, the 1992 to 1997 time period was chosen for the following reasons:
1. With the exception of NOx, there we're no new NAAQS standards for criteria pollutants promulgated and enforced during this time period.
2. Although it is possible for NAAQS nonattainment counties to be reclassified as attainment during this time period, states must submit maintenance plans to prevent environmental degradation in order to be granted reclassification. As a result reclassification in the direction nonattainment  attainment is not likely to result in reduced oversight and enforcement.
3. In 1998 the provisions of California's Electric Utility Industry Restructuring Act for deregulating electricity production were implemented, and by mid-2000 California faced an electricity crisis with rising electricity prices (Farmer et al., 2001 , Joskow, 2001 ).
In addition to limiting the timeframe of analysis to the six year period 1992 to 1997, the analysis that follows focuses on the following four industries:
Paper and Pulp (SIC 26), Chemicals (SIC 28), Petroleum Refining (SIC 29), and Primary Metals (SIC 33). These four industries collectively account for 94% of all generated electricity in manufacturing. 13 Summary statistics for the CMF data are provided in Table I for the four industries and other manufacturing industries, 12 See http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/asm/how_the_data_are_collected/index.html (last accessed March, 2015) , for an overview of the selection criteria for the ASM. 13 In the remainder of the paper when a reference is made to the "four industries" it is referring to the industries listed here.
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respectively. Establishments in the four industries are larger on average than other manufacturing establishments in terms of total value of shipments, cost of materials, and labor input. Manufacturing plants in the four industries are more likely to be multi-unit plants (46%) than plants in other manufacturing industries (16%), and plants in the four industries have a more productive workforce.
Overall, the summary statistics for "other" manufacturing establishments are generally closer to the averages for all manufacturing industries given in the last column of Table I . This feature of the data is due to the fact that establishments in the four industries account for only 7.8 % of total manufacturing establishments.
The last seven rows of Table I CMF collects detailed information on electricity purchases measured in kilowatthours (kWh), and these purchases are converted to Btus using the US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) conversion factor of 3.412 Btu per 1,000 kWh electricity. Additional energy input comes in the form of raw fuels that are consumed during the manufacturing process. The CMF collects data on the total cost of these raw fuel inputs, but does not collect data on the fuel mixture or fuel prices necessary to convert cost of fuels to Btu. In order to convert cost of fuels to Btu input it is assumed that manufacturing plants are using natural gas for their fuel input. This is a reasonable assumption, because according to the EIA's Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey in 1998 73% of all purchased fuels for electricity generation in manufacturing are natural gas. 14 Data on natural gas prices is available from the EIA at the state and year level for industrial consumers. 15 Dividing the plant's cost of fuels by natural gas prices converts the costs to cubic feet of natural gas, and cubic feet are converted to Btu using the EIA's conversion factor of 1.022 Btu per 1,000 cubic foot of natural gas. Plants in the four industries are less productive on average in terms energy productivity than the plants in other manufacturing industries.
Lower energy productivity in the four industries may simply be due to the fact that these industries are much more energy intensive than other manufacturing industries. The average plant in the four industry sample generates 3.3 million kWh of electricity each year, and the average plant in the other manufacturing industries generates less than 20,000 kWh of electricity annually. The last row in Table I provides data on the key outcome variable of interest measuring the degree of vertical integration of the electricity generating process in the plant. As expected plants in the four industries are much more vertically integrated in electricity production, and roughly 18% of the total electricity used is generated onsite. Plants in other manufacturing industries generate only 1% of their electricity on average. Pulp (SIC 26) industry employ more workers and production workers on average, but are the least productive in terms of labor and energy productivity. Most of the industries are between 50% and 60% single-unit establishments, but 64% of the establishments in the Petroleum Refining industry are actually multi-unit establishments. The Primary Metal industry generates the least amount of electricity among the four industries considered and purchases the largest amount of electricity. As a result roughly 4% of the electricity used in the Primary Metal industry is vertically integrated. Indeed, the last row of Table II illustrates that there is considerable heterogeneity across industries in terms of the vertical integration of electricity. Roughly 39% of electricity is generated in the Pulp and
Paper industry, 15% is generated in the Chemical industry (SIC 28), and 19% of electricity is generated in Petroleum Refining. The following section presents the econometric models and results analyzing the impact of heterogeneous NOx regulatory policies on the vertical integration of electricity generation in these four manufacturing industries.
IV. Empirical Analysis
In order to estimate the impact of NOx regulation on distributed generation in manufacturing, the following plant fixed effects model is estimated:
In equation (8) RACT on the degree of vertical integration of electricity in manufacturing.
As mentioned in the data section, equation (8) Results from the estimation of equation (8) are presented in Table III for two alternative measures of vertical integration and two separate specifications with and without additional covariates. Column 1 of Table III presents results for the model specified exactly as in equation (8) These results combined with the results from column 1 of Table III suggest that smaller electricity generators may decide to stop generating electricity under cap-and-trade, but the effect is not pervasive enough to generate a statistically significant impact on overall vertical integration. A possible explanation for this behavior is that smaller generators may not be large enough to justify investment in NOx abatement technology and the increase in marginal cost from RECLAIM drives costs above market electricity prices for small generators.
This seems particularly likely given the fact that RECLAIM has a much lower NOx emission threshold for program participation than the NOx RACT program.
Nonetheless, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of homogenous policy effects using either measure of vertical integration.
The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table III are for the alternative specifications that include all of the variables as specified in equation (8) along with the time-varying plant characteristics listed in Table I . Inclusion of the time varying plant characteristics has no appreciable impact on the key coefficients of interest measuring the impact of NOx regulation using either of the alternative measures of vertical integration.
A. Robustness
As noted in section 2, it is possible to see varying policy effects if the alternative policies are not enforced, non-binding, or differ in terms of environmental stringency. In order to claim similar effects of alternative policy instruments on distributed generation, the following equation is estimated to test whether RECLAIM and NOx RACT have similar impacts on plant NOx emissions:
25 indicator function that is equal to 1 for NOx regulation program participants in year n and equal to zero otherwise. The omitted reference program year is one year prior to program implementation for both NOx policies (i.e.
I[RECY p,t =1994] and I[RACY p,t =1995] are omitted).
The estimated coefficients on the time trends for program participants, γ n and λ n in equation (10), are presented in Figures 1 and 2 for RECLAIM participants and NOx RACT participants, respectively. In order to gain a better understanding of the methods by which NOx policies affect vertical integration several alternative dependent variables are also considered for the specification given in equation (8). Specifically, it is worthwhile to determine whether it is changes in purchased electricity or generated electricity that are driving the results of equation (8). In order to investigate this question, columns 2 and 3 of Table IV present results for similar models using the natural log of purchased electricity and the natural log of total electricity as alternative dependent variables. The results from Table IV suggest that plants regulated by NOx RACT are less vertically integrated due primarily to 26 reductions in generated electricity rather than increases in purchased electricity.
Specifically, NOx RACT results in no statistically significant changes in purchased electricity, but total electricity consumption (generated + purchased) is estimated to decline by 6.7% and the effect is significant at the 10% level. The only other significant variables explaining electricity use are electricity prices, and the sign of the coefficient on electricity prices is of the a priori expected direction. A $1.00 increase in the price of 1,000 kWh of electricity is estimated to reduce purchased electricity and total electricity use by 23% approximately. 
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where all variables are defined as in equation (8) except the dependent variable of interest is now the natural log of energy productivity as defined in section 3 and Table I . Results from the estimation of equation (11) are presented in column 4 of Table IV , and suggest that RECLAIM participants increase the average productivity of energy by 22% in response to NOx regulation. Interestingly, the average energy productivity at NOx RACT plants declines by 4% post regulation.
One possible explanation for this decline in productivity at NOx RACT plants is that abatement technology such as low NOx burners (LNB) or selective catalytic reduction (SCR) does not increase output and may generate less steam in the case of LNB or require energy to operate in the case of SCR (US Environmental 27 Protection Agency, 1999). Overall, from an energy efficiency standpoint capand-trade appears to be preferable to traditional command-and-control regulatory instruments. There are no significant differences among the two instruments in terms of policy effects on distributed generation, but cap-and-trade policies are associated with significant improvements in overall plant energy efficiency.
V. Conclusion
This research estimates the impact of heterogeneous NOx regulatory regimes on distributed electricity generation in manufacturing. Theoretically In addition to the impact on vertical integration, RECLAIM is estimated to result in increased investment in plant energy efficiency. These energy efficiency investments result in a 22% increase in average energy productivity at RECLAIM plants. In comparison, NOx RACT plants experience a 4% decline in average energy productivity because process specific NOx regulations do not incentivize investments in energy efficiency of upstream production processes.
In sum, cap-and-trade regulatory policies are more likely to encourage investments in energy efficiency, and we find no significant differences in policy effects on distributed electricity generation. A cap-and-trade system affords regulated firms flexibility in choosing the least-cost compliance alternatives by incentivizing improvements in energy consumption and emissions. Cap-and-trade therefore seems preferable to command-and-control in terms of energy efficiency, but it remains to be seen if cap-and-trade policies are preferable to no policy in manufacturing in the presence of multiple unregulated market failures. 16,100 a Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. b Number of observations and establishments are rounded to the nearest hundred to avoid disclosure risks. (10) using an indicator variable for vertical integration.
